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[T]hese guys at MIT and BBN… We’d all gotten really excited about
interactive computing, and we had a kind of little religion growing here
about how this was going to be totally different than batch processing… I
had this little picture in my mind of how we were going to get people and
computers really thinking together. [ARPA director Jack] Ruina was
thinking in terms of command and control, and it didn’t take really very
much to see how this would work.  I wanted to get all this done.  So I had
the notion [that] ‘command and control essentially depends on interactive
computing so the military really needs this.’  I was one of the few people
who, I think, had this positive feeling toward the military. It wasn’t just to
fund our stuff, but they really needed it and they were good guys. So I set
out to build this program.
- J. C. R. Licklider1
Introduction
Value-sensitive design is a forward-looking enterprise, aiming to integrate
human values into the design of technologies.2   Its insights also prove useful as a way
to illuminate the values already embedded in technologies.  This paper, as a historical
analysis of the foundational values of ARPA’s Information Processing Techniques
Office (IPTO) and the ARPANET, is an attempt to build a bridge between the
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2intellectual and policy history of the Cold War and the value-sensitive design of
cyberspace.
By analyzing U. S. science policy and the development of ARPA and IPTO
between 1957 and 1969, I argue that the ideological framework of the science policy
consensus shaped the institutions and relationships between the government and
computing that led to the creation of IPTO, and eventually to the ARPANET.  During
this time period, the values of this broader consensus created space for individual
computer scientists to incorporate their own values into the creation of IPTO and the
design of cyberspace.
 Consensus—among science policymakers and among academic and government
computer researchers—was a dominant founding principle of IPTO research between
1957 and 1969.  How this “consensus” operated within the creation and activities of
IPTO influenced how it would evolve as a directing principle for the design of
computer networks and cyberspace.  Three areas are particularly helpful for
understanding how “consensus” values directed the creation of the ARPANET.  First,
the ideology of the post-World War II science policy consensus, finely focused after the
launch of Sputnik, demonstrates how cooperation between universities, industry, and
the government guided scientific research in the first half of the Cold War.  Second, the
hiring in 1961 of J.C.R. Licklider to direct the IPTO enabled him to coordinate military
and academic computer research around his concept of “interactive computing.”
Third, the arrival in 1966 of Larry Roberts at IPTO and the launching of the ARPANET
highlights how ARPA could leverage the science policy consensus to achieve its
advanced research mission.
This examination of the values of the stakeholders in IPTO research can help us
to understand the ways that these values shaped the creation of the ARPANET.  The
3influence of the values expressed by these actors was decisive.  They believed that
government had an obligation to support a broad base of scientific research to promote
both the public good and the national defense; that IPTO-sponsored computing
research would accomplish both military and scientific objectives; and that IPTO could
leverage its power within this consensus to create a network to share resources and
unite researchers over geographical distance.
Science policy “consensus,” Sputnik, and ARPA
Historians note a self-conscious “consensus” among both American
policymakers and scientists in the late 1940s and early 1950s.3  In the wake of Nazi
Germany and in the face of the Cold War Soviet “menace,” Americans fashioned and
clung to what historian Arthur Schlesinger has called a “vital center” in order to resist
the threat of totalitarianism from the right and the left, and, ultimately, to secure the
survival of American liberal democracy into the 1950s and beyond.4  Policymakers and
historians identify a science policy consensus operating among scientists and
policymakers during this same period in the first 20 years of the Cold War.  Among the
tenets of this broad consensus was that the American victory in World War II owed
much to the vitality of basic science research, especially advances in physics that led to
microwave radar, proximity fuses, solid-fuel rockets, and the atomic bomb.  The
indisputable lesson was that “national security depended upon research in pure
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4science.”5  The premise that the federal government should completely pull away from
its support of science research during peacetime was never a serious scientific or
political option.6  The historian J. Merton England stressed this very point by
introducing his seminal A Patron for Pure Science: The National Science Foundation’s
Formative Years, 1945-1957 with the words of Montaigne: “Men only debate and
question of the branch, not of the tree.”7
Historian Bruce Smith notes that the central features of the science policy
consensus reveal Vannevar Bush’s seminal influence on its character.  Five ideas
particularly shaped science policy: basic research would drive the system;
commercialization and the creation of new markets should follow “almost
automatically” government investments in basic research; the control of science through
legislation was of less importance than promoting the growth of scientific research;
technology would play a crucial role in foreign policy, to maintain military superiority
and as an enabler of free trade; and the ideological support for the consensus came with
the widespread faith in the progress of science and understanding that the “growth of
federal research served everybody’s interests—universities, government agencies,
industry, [and] congressional committees.”8
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5The launch and orbit of Sputnik I on October 4, 1957 created psychological and
scientific shock waves in the science policy community, as well as throughout American
politics and the American public. Sputnik crystallized political perceptions of the
need—both psychological and technical, especially in light of Sputnik’s implications for
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)—for fundamental breakthroughs in
American science.  As a result, federal spending on science research increased
dramatically in the decade after Sputnik, prompting scientists and historians to label
these years a “golden age” of American science.9
Almost immediately after Sputnik, President Dwight Eisenhower created ARPA
as the agency responsible for coordinating advanced, high-risk research that could lead
to technological breakthroughs for the military at the height of the Cold War.  Founded
in early 1958, ARPA was an institutional manifestation of a combination of three factors:
Eisenhower’s management style, the Sputnik-inspired technological crisis, and the
science policy consensus.  The creation of ARPA, as an agency outside of the three
services yet responsible for coordinating advanced R&D for military applications, was a
direct manifestation of Eisenhower’s desire to “strike a balance among the competing
claims of the services,” especially in the areas of space and ballistic missile R&D.10
While prominent scientists such as James Killian pressed during the 1950s for the
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6Department of Defense (DoD) to reorganize R&D and to further support the basic
research that would prevent the U.S. from “falling behind” the Soviets, Sputnik was the
decisive catalyst for the creation of an agency like ARPA to coordinate advanced
military R&D pushing the frontiers of science and technology.11  As a 1975 ARPA-
commissioned institutional history suggested, “Thus ARPA was to be spawned in an
environment which equated basic science with military security.”12
Existing histories of ARPA and IPTO explain the creation of ARPA as a product
of the Sputnik scare, but they do not mention how the creation of ARPA was a logical
outgrowth of the consensus, developed throughout the twentieth century, of dominant
American policy positions on the role of the federal government in promoting science
for the general welfare and for the national defense.  “These ideas were shaped,”
reported the ARPA-commissioned history, “throughout the early 1950s, largely by a
group of scientists who had come to fear that government either misused or
misunderstood modern science and technology… When the bell rang—Sputnik—they
were ready with a rather complete agenda and proceeded to act on it.”13
Computers for the national defense, 1945-1961
One of the most vivid sites of the operation of this consensus can be seen in the
support of computing research by the DoD throughout the Cold War.  Since World War
II, scientists in the military and in government recognized the relevance of computers to
the national defense and explored ways that advanced computing could enhance
national security.  One example is the SAGE air defense system, developed during the
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71950s by MIT scientists, funded by the Air Force, as part of an effort to use computers to
work with people, in real time, to solve complex problems.  SAGE’s use of
computers—in an immediate, intelligent, interactive manner—was a departure from the
standard contemporary use for computers as batch-processing number-crunchers.
While SAGE thus set a technological precedent for large, interactive computer systems,
it also set the administrative precedent of a computer research project that was of high
value both to the academic research community and to the military.14
Developments in Cold War politics and in the technical aspects of computing
coincided to create an opportunity to advance the state of computing.  In March 1961
President John F. Kennedy called on Congress to fund improved command and control
systems that would be “more flexible, more selective, more deliberate, better protected,
and under ultimate civilian authority at all times.”15  As it worked out, strong policy
support for science research for the national defense occurred just as significant
developments in computer hardware, timesharing, displays, and programming were
changing the nature of computing itself.16
J. C. R. Licklider and Man-Computer Symbiosis as a creation of the consensus
The most significant product of the consensus for computer research came with
the creation of IPTO.  With the arrival of the Kennedy administration in 1961, ARPA
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8Director Jack Ruina and Eugene Fubini17 decided to centralize the DoD’s research on
computing technology into one program.  Ruina asked Joseph C. R. Licklider, Professor
of Psychology at MIT’s Lincoln Lab, to lead the office.  Licklider, known to Ruina as a
“man of some distinction,”18 had previous experience in military science through
acoustic research for the Navy during World War II, as a member of the Air Force
Scientific Advisory Board, and an advisor to Air Force studies since 1952.
Licklider became interested in computers after his research in psychoacoustics
led him to see the need for a new kind of use for computers and new kinds of man-
computer interaction: to, in effect, make “the human and the computer partners in
creative thinking.”19  A 1960 paper entitled “Man-Computer Symbiosis” stood as a
summary of his vision for the future of computing, developed through his personal
research and also influenced by the “tremendous intellectual ferment in Cambridge
after World War II.”20  Licklider participated in a circle of Cambridge intellectuals and
scientists who came together in weekly meetings led by Norbert Wiener, MIT
mathematician and author of Cybernetics.  Licklider’s “Man-Computer Symbiosis,”
according to historian Paul Edwards, “became the universally cited founding
articulation of the movement to establish a time-sharing, interactive computing
regime.”21  Bob Taylor, in his preface to a 1990 reprint of “Man-Computer Symbiosis,”
presented the staggering influence of Licklider’s vision in a simple statement: “All users
                                                
17 Fubini was Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E). The DDR&E was the only step in the chain
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18 Jack Ruina interview, April 20, 1989, in Cambridge, MA, conducted by William Aspray, from transcript. Charles
Babbage Institute, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis.
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Advanced Research Projects Agency (Minneapolis, MN: The Charles Babbage Institute, 1992), 39.
20 J. C. R. Licklider interview, October 28, 1988, in Cambridge, MA, conducted by William Aspray and Arthur
Norberg, from transcript. Charles Babbage Institute, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis.
9of interactive computing and every company that employs computer people owe him a
great debt.”22
Historians of IPTO and of the major networking projects it supported (Project
MAC and the ARPANET) marvel at the organizational and managerial
accomplishments of such a small office.23  Four features of IPTO’s unique approach to
managing scientific research have direct roots in the postwar science policy consensus:
IPTO’s reliance on “centers of excellence”; the “consonance of interest” between
military command and control research and interactive computing already underway at
places like MIT and CMU; IPTO’s ability quickly to fund significant projects; and
almost unquestioning support of IPTO from ARPA, the DoD, and Congress.
1. Centers of Excellence
Since World War II, the concentration of federal support for scientific research in
several “centers of excellence” reflected the influence of Vannevar Bush’s vision for the
distribution of federal support: Bush favored the development of science, by scientists,
for the sake of science.24  According to Robert Fano, a colleague of Licklider’s at MIT
                                                                                                                                                            
21 Paul N. Edwards, The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America (Cambridge,
MA: The MIT Press, 1997), 266.
22 Preface by Robert W. Taylor "In Memoriam: J.C.R. Licklider 1915-1990," Digital Research Center Research
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23 Admirers of the ARPA and IPTO approach include Barber Associates, ARPA, Norberg and O’Neill, Transforming
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24 Kevles, "The National Science Foundation," and Harvey Brooks, "Evolution of the U. S. Science Policy Debate:
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Science Policy, December 9, 1994.
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and a recipient of IPTO funding as director of MIT’s Project MAC, Licklider believed
very deeply in this concept:
Licklider’s idea was to create what he called a Center of Excellence… You
know, the place where you breed very good genius… This notion of
several centers of excellence around the United States was approved at the
very top [of DoD]…  I know that Gene Fubini… was very much behind it.
So, of course, was Ruina.25
This strategy already had created massive Cold War research facilities at American
universities, most spectacularly at MIT and Stanford, but also at Berkeley, Michigan,
and Caltech.26
Licklider, when asked to name his major accomplishments at IPTO between 1962
and 1964, responded: “I think that I found a lot of bright people and got them working
in this area, well enough to almost define this area.  I got it moving… It was more than
just a collection of bright people working in the field.  It was a thing that organized
itself a little bit into a community,” a community that by the 1990s would be known as
the pioneers of the Internet.  As Taylor recognized in a 1990 tribute to Licklider: “The
leaders he chose twenty-five years ago now read like a Who’s Who of computing
research.”27
2. “A great consonance of interest’
Licklider’s explanation of his intellectual interest in directing IPTO made it very
clear that he viewed the opportunity to work with the military as a chance to advance
                                                
25 Robert M. Fano interview, April 20-21, 1989, in Cambridge, MA, conducted by Arthur L. Norberg, from
transcript. Charles Babbage Institute, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis.
26 Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and
Stanford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).  It is worth noting that the first four directors of IPTO, in
office from 1962-1975, were all affiliated with the MIT Lincoln Lab prior to their arrival at ARPA.
27 Taylor, “In Memoriam.”
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his evangelical mission, his “religious conversion to interactive computing.”28  His
recollections in 1989 reflect a singular anticipation of the future of  interactive
computing.  “Every time I had the chance to talk,” he later recalled of his first days at
ARPA, “I said that the mission is interactive computing.”  Licklider responded to a
question asking why he pushed it so strongly by saying, “I was just a true believer. I
thought, this is going to revolutionize how people think, how things are done.”29  This
was as true for his academic colleagues as it was for the military.  Charles Herzfeld,
ARPA administrator from 1961-1966 and Director from June 1965 to March 1967,
remembered Licklider giving a “series of introductory lectures to modern computing”
beginning in 1962.  Herzfeld recalled that the lectures spoke to the broader values of
making “computing accessible, to make it more efficient, to really use the power of
computers that were available.”30
Licklider’s vision meshed well with ARPA Director Jack Ruina’s understanding
of the potential for new forms of computing.  Ruina recalled,
From my experience in the Pentagon of a couple of years, what I found
was that the growth of computer technology, hardware technology,
clearly was exceeding what people knew what to do with it… To my
mind, the issue at that time was how to explore the potential power that
was growing in hardware for applications other than straight number
crunching.31
In his discussions with Fubini and Ruina before he moved to ARPA, Licklider
confirmed Ruina’s experience:
                                                
28 Howard Rheingold, Tools for Thought, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1985, reprint 2000), 138.  The
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in Lee and Rosin, “Project MAC Interviews.”
29 Licklider interview, Charles Babbage Institute.
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the problems of command and control were essentially problems of man
computer interaction… Fubini essentially agreed 100% with that and so
did Ruina… Why didn’t we develop an interactive computing?  If the
Defense Department’s need for that was to provide an underpinning for
command and control, fine.  But it was probably necessary in intelligence
and other parts of the military too. So, we essentially found that there was
a great consonance of interest here, despite the fact that we were using
different terms we were talking about the same thing.32
Licklider’s approach to developing computing for both military uses and
to advance the general state of the field is clearly expressed in Licklider’s 1963
memo to IPTO’s researchers, whom he addressed as the “Members and Affiliates
of the Intergalactic Computer Network”:
The fact is, as I see it, that the military greatly needs solutions to many or
most of the problems that will arise if we tried to make good use of the
[computing] facilities that are coming into existence. I am hoping that
there will be, in our individual efforts, enough evident advantage in
cooperative programming and operation to lead us to solve the problems
and, thus, to bring into being the technology that the military needs.33
In retrospect, Licklider’s achievement was to articulate his vision for interactive
computing in a way that would appeal to both the military and to academic and private
computer researchers.  Licklider’s work as director of IPTO shows how he was able to
create a consensus around his vision to explore new frontiers:
The technical need is definite in command and control, and also urgent; at
the same time, in almost every area of human activity that involves
information processing, there is the possibility of a profound advance,
which will be almost literally an advance in the way of thinking.34
                                                
32 Licklider interview, Charles Babbage Institute.
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Communication Device," Science and Technology, April, 1968, reprinted in “In Memoriam: J. C. R. Licklider,
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3. “We were light on our feet”
IPTO’s third organizational advantage was that it could move quickly to support
research, another principle enshrined in the science policy consensus canon in the wake
of Sputnik.  Ivan Sutherland, director of IPTO from June 1964 to June 1966, spoke about
the ease, on both an ideological and administrative level, with which ARPA could
dispense funding:
My understanding of the mechanism was that if I could convince the
ARPA director that something was sensible to do, it got done…  I always
felt the principal hurdle was to convince the ARPA director that it was a
sensible task.  I guess Al Blue [IPTO administrator, 1965-1977] and the
administrative machinery ran smoothly enough that the ARPA orders got
written.35
On his role in the “administrative machinery,” Blue recalled fondly, “ARPA was
a unique place.  I am sure you have heard the fact that we could get an idea in the
morning and have the guy working under a Letter of Intent by 4:00 the next day.”36
Charles Herzfeld, director of ARPA from June 1965 to March 1967, said that “ARPA
was the only place in town where somebody could come into my office with a good
idea and leave with a million dollars at the end of the day.”37  Indeed, this is precisely
what happened in 1966 to Bob Taylor, director of IPTO at the time.  Taylor wanted to
convince Herzfeld of the necessity for creating a network that would connect IPTO
computers.  Such an idea, directly in line with Licklider’s philosophy, would spawn
greater connections within the IPTO research community and save the DoD from
having to buy more and more expensive mainframes.  After a brief discussion, Taylor
                                                
35 Ivan Sutherland interview, May 1, 1989, in Pittsburgh, PA, conducted by William Aspray, from transcript.
Charles Babbage Institute, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis.
36 Allan Blue interview, June 12, 1989, in Minnetonka, MN, conducted by William Aspray, from transcript. Charles
Babbage Institute, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis.
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left Herzfeld’s office with a million dollars for the network.  It was a stunning
achievement, even at ARPA.  An account in Where Wizards Stay Up Late of “The Fastest
Million Dollars” aptly characterizes Taylor’s surprise at how easy it was: “’Jesus Christ,’
he said to himself softly.  ‘That only took twenty minutes.’”38
4. “Benign neglect” and “No concern with relevance”
ARPA directors, officers, and staffers universally praised ARPA’s practice of
delegating authority to program managers, who would in turn allow their contractors
to proceed with their research, more or less undisturbed and on their own terms.  This
phenomenon was amplified within IPTO, which, due to its relatively small size and
budget, did not capture the attention of ARPA directors or their superiors in DoD.
Ruina stressed in a 1989 interview that IPTO “was not a major program,” and
that, as director of ARPA, he was more occupied with ARPA’s programs on ballistic
missile defense and nuclear test detection.  Licklider recalled of Ruina, “[h]e had much
bigger fish to fry; this was a small part of his life.  I’ve told him since that I’ve felt it was
a kind of benign neglect.”  Licklider continued, “I think he [Ruina] also had a feeling, ‘I
have got 50 or 100 million dollars in getting these nuclear warheads back in; why can’t I
have 10 or 15 in command and control…”39  In light of the United States’ decisive use of
information technologies in the 1991 Gulf War and when considering the impact of the
computer networking on the global economy, the decision to put “10 or 15 million”
annually into research exploring “interactive computing” was one of the best
investment decisions of American history.
                                                                                                                                                            
37 Herzfeld interview, Charles Babbage Institute.
38 Katie Hafner and Matthew Lyon, Where Wizards Stay up Late: The Origins of the Internet (New York:
Touchstone, 1996), 42.
15
IPTO had the autonomy and the money to fund what they perceived to be smart
people and good research.  As Allan Blue recalled of the era before the passage of the
Mansfield Amendment in 1970,40 IPTO was
an environment in which you gave money to good people and expected
good results. There was no concern with relevance… if a program
manager has a good idea, he has got two people to convince that that is a
good idea before the guy goes to work.  He has got the director of his
office and the director of ARPA, and that is it.41
Licklider highlighted this approach by pointing out that “my two immediate superiors
in the chain of command, Ruina and Sproull, did me the great favor of listening intently
long enough to decide that they were really fundamentally in support of what was
going on.  After that they spent little time heckling me.”42
IPTO’s autonomy was further reinforced by its relative invisibility to the
Congressional oversight committees that approved ARPA’s budget (IPTO’s budget
during the 1960s represented between 5 and 10% of the total ARPA budget).43  By
demonstrating the need in the military for flexible, reliable, and effective computing
systems, and by focusing on the relevance of IPTO research to a wide variety of military
and scientific needs, ARPA directors defended IPTO’s budget from further scrutiny by
sticking to the rules of the consensus.  In other words, it was bad politics in Cold War
America to prevent the DoD, and hence ARPA and IPTO, from doing what they
thought was best.
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Without exception, the individuals involved in these “early days” of networking
express pride that their research was supported and allowed to blossom.  As Herzfeld
reflected in 1990, Licklider
predicted the future of computing in America remarkably well…
[Licklider] said, ‘We clearly can do the following.  It makes sense and we
ought to do it, so let’s go do it.’ And indeed, it happened.  Networking,
interactive graphics, time-sharing, and all these things that are now so
commonplace were in the air, and he saw to it that they would happen.44
Leveraging the Consensus: Taylor, Roberts, and the ARPANET
ARPA’s use of its influence to leverage personnel and projects between 1966 and
1969 illuminates the ways that ARPA used its position within the science policy
consensus.  Robert Taylor, IPTO Director from June 1966 to March 1969, joined IPTO
because he “became heartily subscribed to the Licklider vision of interactive
computing.”45  Taylor, convinced that Larry Roberts in the MIT Lincoln Lab would be
the ideal candidate to direct a proposed IPTO computer network, found no success in
his initial attempts to bring Roberts to IPTO.  Once Taylor realized in “September or
October of 1966” that the DoD provided 51% of the Lincoln Lab’s funding, he asked
Herzfeld (ARPA Director at the time) to call the Lincoln Lab’s director and “tell him it’s
in Lincoln Lab’s and ARPA’s best interests for him to tell Larry Roberts to come down
and do this.”46  Although he was “not particularly eager for the job,” Roberts was
working in the Pentagon for IPTO by January 1967.47
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What was initially a move that Taylor called “blackmail” soon became an
opportunity for Roberts, 28 years old at the time, to pursue his goal of sharing the
research of the computer science community with a broader audience.  Roberts recalled,
I was also coming to the point of view, separately from that [Herzfeld’s
“51%” phone call], that this research was not getting to the rest of the
world…  I was feeling we were now probably twenty years ahead of what
anybody was going to use and still there was no path for them to pick
up…  So I was really feeling a pull towards getting more into the real
world, rather than remain in that sort of an ivory tower…  So they
eventually convinced me it was a good idea—particularly after Lincoln
said that was the best place for me.48
Some of the tensions as well as the benefits of ARPA’s leverage are evident within
Roberts’ statement.  Roberts’ recollections make it clear that ARPA—specifically IPTO—
had by 1966 established itself as the most advanced and influential sponsor and
organizer of computer research, and that its position left him little choice—both
professionally and intellectually—other than moving to the Pentagon.
Roberts quickly learned to use ARPA’s leverage to further the computer
networking research agenda he pursued at Lincoln Lab.  The objective for the
ARPANET, according to Taylor, was to “allow people who were separated
geographically to discover and then exploit common interests.”49  A network, which
would allow this sort of sharing of IPTO-funded research, would also enable the
sharing of computing power as well as “to get these timesharing communities—which
had been built up locally as a community… to build metacommunities out of these by
connecting them.”50  The reflections of Taylor and Roberts indicate that the motivating
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values behind the creation of the ARPANET were to share IPTO research, IPTO
resources, and to broaden the computer research community.
The “resource-sharing” element of the ARPANET is another example of IPTO’s
leveraging of their power within the Cold War science policy consensus.  Upon
presenting the plans for the ARPANET to IPTO Principal Investigators (PIs) and the
requirement that all IPTO-funded sites must participate, Roberts encountered
“tremendous resistance” from the PIs.51  Despite the support of Herzfeld and Licklider,
Taylor remembered that “most of the people I talked to were not initially enamored
with the idea.”52  Roberts, the object of ARPA’s leverage only months earlier, skillfully
turned that leverage to his advantage:
Well, the universities were being funded by us, and we said, "We are
going to build a network and you are going to participate in it.  And you
are going to connect it to your machines.  By virtue of that we are going to
reduce our computing demands on the office.  So that you understand, we
are not going to buy you new computers until you have used up all of the
resources of the network.  So over time we started forcing them to be
involved, because the universities in general did not want to share their
computers with anybody.53
Just as Roberts and his boss at Lincoln Lab in 1966 had no choice but to give in to
ARPA’s demands, the IPTO-funded PIs were more or less coerced into making their
computers part of the ARPANET.  But, also like Roberts, the PIs came to appreciate the
results of the “arm-twisting.”  According to Roberts, the pioneers of Artificial
Intelligence at MIT and Stanford, Marvin Minsky and John McCarthy, initially
hated the fact that somebody else might use their computer. They found
that to be a gross invasion of their privacy. Eventually, they applauded it
because they could copy each others’ papers!  They could get at the
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writing of each others’ groups and that sort of thing, so they found the
communication valuable to their own groups. But initially, they were very
negative. I still remember them fighting all along the way.54
Roberts’ management of the ARPANET would immediately be
characterized by what Janet Abbate identified as “informal mechanisms aimed at
creating and reinforcing common values and goals.”55  “The PIs were the primary
group we worked with,” Roberts recalled, “both in the PI meetings and
individually, in order to get a consensus in the community of what was good and
bad… pretty much everyone helped in the process, even if it was not conscious
to them.”56  The influence of consensus-based development in the history of the
Internet between 1969 and the present is a subject outside the scope of this paper
that deserves further study.  At first glance, however, the use of voluntary
consensus standards to create the architecture of the Internet, and the Internet
Engineering Task Force’s motto, “rough consensus and running code,” both
testify to the enduring power of “consensus” as a governing value of
cyberspace.57
Conclusion
Recent historiography of the Cold War and of Cold War computing points to
“containment” metaphors and “closed world discourse” as dominant themes of the
period between 1945 and the present.  In contrast to these metaphors and themes, the
evidence presented in this paper suggests that the theme of “consensus” served as a
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major factor in the mobilization of science for the national defense, in the creation of
ARPA, in the operating philosophy of IPTO, in the hiring of scientists such as Licklider
and Roberts, and in the intellectual formation and development of the ARPANET.  A
greater awareness of the ways that “consensus” worked in this period—the “pre-
history” of the Internet—provides a richer context for evaluating the unique features of
the Internet, such as its open architecture, collegial culture, and standards-based
governance.  If we interpret “closed world discourse” as dominant among the values of
the Internet’s design, such features as the Internet’s open and decentralized architecture
would be more difficult to explain.
Attention to “consensus” as another founding principle of the ARPANET’s
design helps us to account for its open and decentralized architecture as well as its
consensus-based governance.  It can also be seen as a set of attitudes that created space
for human values to be incorporated into the ARPANET’s design.  Abbate’s Inventing
the Internet highlights several of these values: responsiveness, reliability, expandability,
standard protocols to promote interoperability, decentralized complexity through
layering, and informal and inclusive management.
Calls for historians to locate the history of the Internet “within its social, political,
and cultural contexts”58 underscore the need for both academics and
policymakers—especially those working closely with technical and/or administrative
aspects of the Internet—to think broadly when considering the values that have
influenced and will continue to influence the design of cyberspace.  Between 1957 and
1969, the Cold War consensus about the roles of science and government shaped the
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creation of the IPTO and the ARPANET.  Some of the broader issues of this Cold War
consensus included the convictions that the government and the universities should
cooperate to advance science as a path toward national progress and in order to protect
national security.
In 2001 we may look to the influence of similarly broad issues such as the
features of “globalization” that tend toward global economic and social integration and
stratification, and frequently pit corporate interests against scientific or “public”
interests.  The broader themes of globalization already have influenced public policy
debates in broadband and wireless deployment and the “digital divide.”  Security
researchers complain of the “chilling effects” of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
on their efforts to create more secure systems and encryption techniques.59  Scholars of
globalization also detect familiar themes in debates about the nature of intellectual
property and whether software engineering should follow a proprietary model or,
instead, a competing “open source” model.60  A startling transpartisan alliance between
House Majority Leader Dick Armey (R-Texas) and the American Civil Liberties Union
highlights the broad-based concern with the increasing threats to privacy posed by
public surveillance systems.61  As historical analysis clearly demonstrates, these and
other broad value conflicts will continue to exert significant influence on the design and
governance of cyberspace.
                                                
59 See the “Chilling Effects Clearinghouse,” http://eon.law.harvard.edu/chill (visited September 18, 2001) and the
Electronic Frontier Foundation’s coverage of Felten vs. RIAA, http://www.eff.org/Legal/Cases/Felten_v_RIAA
(visited September 18, 2001).
60 Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books, 1999) and Eric Raymond, The
Cathedral and the Bazaar: Musings on Linux and Open Source By An Accidental Revolutionary (Sebastopol, CA:
O’Reilly & Associates, Inc., 1999).
61 See “Proliferation of Surveillance Devices Threatens Privacy: Joint Statement of House Majority Leader Dick
Armey, R-TX, And The American Civil Liberties Union,” http://www.aclu.org/news/2001/n071101a.html (visited
September 18, 2001).
